

Secret

NSA review completed

File

**Third Report****COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS**

(This report covers the period from
4 March through 8 March 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense*

Secret

25

25X1

9 March 1973

DIA Review
Completed.

Page Denied

25X1

9 March 1973

Third Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*

(This report covers the period from
4 March through 8 March 1973)

The Key Points

- There is still no sign of a slowdown in the infiltration of North Vietnamese troops, military equipment and supplies toward and into South Vietnam in clear violation of the Vietnam settlement agreement.
- The number of combat incidents initiated by the Communists in violation of the ceasefire terms remains at a moderate level in South Vietnam and at a low level in Laos.

* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.

25X1

25X1

The Details

(NOTE: This is the third in a series of reports detailing recent Communist actions which we believe to be violations of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.

25X1

25X1

A. Continuing Infiltration and Redeployment of North Vietnamese Personnel in Violation of the Agreement

1. We continued to receive conclusive evidence during the reporting period that Hanoi is still infiltrating military personnel toward and into South Vietnam in violation of the settlement agreement. There are still some 30,000 North Vietnamese infiltrators moving through the pipeline, and of these at least 8,000 almost certainly started their trip south from North Vietnam after 28 January.

25X1

2. Beyond this infiltration of replacement fillers for existing Communist units in South Vietnam, other information received in the past few days indicates that Hanoi has deployed a new integral unit--an anti-aircraft artillery regiment--from North Vietnam to Quang Tri Province, probably after 28 January. If true, this is the first case in which a complete North Vietnamese unit of regimental size has moved into South Vietnam since the ceasefire. (The move is probably part of the broader Communist activity which has occurred recently around Khe Sanh airfield in Quang Tri Province. See paragraph 4 (d), below, for additional information on this activity.)

25X1

25X1

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies by the North Vietnamese in Violation of the Agreements

3. The following paragraphs outline the detected movement of military equipment and supplies out of North Vietnam into Laos and South Vietnam since 3 March. Some activity which occurred prior to 3 March but has only recently come to our attention is also included. The evidence indicates that large quantities of supplies continue to move in the supply network and will soon be available to NVA units in Laos and South Vietnam. The very high tonnages observed on the move in the North Vietnam Panhandle, although lacking a specific destination, are undoubtedly programmed for movement to the south, and the large number of vehicles observed in the tri-border area (where Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam meet) almost certainly reflects an intention to move supplies into central and southern South Vietnam in the future.

25X1

4. The following instances of Communist logistic activity were observed on roads within South Vietnam in the areas of the Laos border and in the DMZ during the period under review. Although detected within South Vietnam, they probably reflect supplies which have recently entered South Vietnam.

- (a) Eleven cargo trucks were observed entering South Vietnam on Route 9 northwest of Khe Sanh during the period [redacted]
- (b) 36 cargo trucks were seen halted on Route Q9D between Khe Sanh and the Laos border [redacted]
- (c) In the DMZ itself, 17 cargo vehicles were detected moving south on

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Routes 103 and 1009

25X1

25X1

(d) North Vietnamese efforts to improve the airfield at Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province have continued during the reporting period. On [redacted] work was observed in progress on upgrading a second runway at the airfield. [redacted] the three SA-2 sites near the Khe Sanh airfield (which had been operational as recently [redacted] were observed to be unoccupied. There is no evidence, however, that the North Vietnamese have withdrawn the SA-2 equipment to North Vietnam.

25X1

25X1

(e) [redacted] the North Vietnamese are continuing to construct a road from Route 165/966 in southern Laos into Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces of South Vietnam. This cross border route is not close to any of the "legal" border entry points which the Communists have requested, and its only logical use would be as a supply route into the central coastal regions of South Vietnam.

25X1

5.

[redacted] North Vietnamese logistic activity in the Laos Panhandle and northeastern Cambodia. Historical precedent would suggest that much of this activity probably involves supplies destined for South Vietnam.

25X1

(a) [redacted] 285 vehicles were observed moving southward through

25X1

[redacted]

the Lao Panhandle to southern South Vietnam for logistical support there.

(b) Four NVA logistic units in the tri-border area--one of them in southern Laos and the other three in northeastern Cambodia--were observed [redacted] with a combined total of 205 cargo vehicles available for use.

25X1

(c) [redacted] a major North Vietnamese logistic unit in the tri-border area was observed sending 16 trucks in the direction of central South Vietnam.

25X1

(d) [redacted] 57 North Vietnamese cargo trucks were observed moving southward on Route 1201 through the Mu Gia Pass from North Vietnam into Laos.

25X1

(e) 380 cargo trucks were seen traveling south on Route 912 through the Ban Karai Pass into southern Laos between [redacted]

25X1

(f) Directly west of the DMZ in Laos there were 58 cargo trucks observed moving south on Route 1033 during the period [redacted]

25X1

6. There is additional evidence of the continuing movement within North Vietnam of military and other

25X1

[redacted]

supplies which are probably moving to southern Laos or South Vietnam.

(a)

[redacted] 65 cargo trucks were observed halted along Route 137 on the North Vietnam side of the Laos/North Vietnam border.

25X1

(b)

[redacted] 25 cargo trucks were observed on Route 1036 (north of the western DMZ) in North Vietnam [redacted]. The trucks were halted, and the direction of intended movement could not be determined.

25X1

25X1

(c)

Large quantities of cargo were observed moving between two NVA logistic units in southern North Vietnam [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Although the specific destination and the types of cargo involved are unknown, about 2,500 tons of supplies were observed moving between these units during this period.

C. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces in South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

7. In South Vietnam, the total numbers of Communist initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January and for the last five days (4 Mar - 8 Mar) are shown below:

25X1

Military Region	Total Since Cease-Fire Level of Action		Last Five Days (4-8 Mar) Level of Action	
	Major <u>1/</u>	Minor <u>1/</u>	Major	Minor
MR 1	465	1,840	42	157
MR 2	115	694	9	51
MR 3	113	1,002	11	71
MR 4	200	2,054	21	101
Totals	893	5,590	83 (109) <u>2/</u>	380 (550) <u>2/</u>

1/ DOD definitions of major and minor violations are contained in ANNEX III.

2/ Denotes totals of previous five days.

8. During the past five days, the number of major violations decreased from 109 to 83. The largest decline occurred in MR 1 where the total declined from 59 to 42. The number of minor violations decreased from 550 to 380. The greatest reduction occurred in MR 4 which reported 101 minor violations as opposed to 236 during the preceding five days.

9. The following is a chronological listing of the most significant "major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past five days (4 through 8 March 1973). We have carefully examined all the evidence on the combat incidents listed in this paragraph, and have excluded from the listing any incidents where the evidence of Communist instigation was not clear-cut.



MILITARY REGION ONE

- (a) On 4 March, nine miles north-northeast of Quang Tri City, a Vietnam naval patrol craft received an enemy attack-by-fire of an unknown number and type of rounds.



CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



- (b) On 4 March, in the ARVN Airborne Division zone, the enemy directed three attacks-by-fire, totaling 130 mortar rounds, at airborne forces.
- (c) On 5 and 6 March, southwest of Quang Tri City, the enemy launched 10 attacks-by-fire totaling about 500 mortar rounds against elements of five ARVN airborne battalions. One of the attacks was followed by a ground assault.
- (d) On 6 and 7 March, southwest of Quang Tri City, the enemy directed eight attacks-by-fire totaling over 2,100 rounds of mixed ordnance at elements of three ARVN airborne battalions. Three of the attacks were followed by ground assaults.
- (e) On 6 March, nine miles west of Hue, elements of two ARVN infantry battalions received two separate enemy attacks-by-fire totaling 140 mortar rounds. One of the attacks was followed by a ground assault.
- (f) Southwest of Quang Tri City, on 7 and 8 March, the enemy launched eleven attacks-by-fire totaling 960 rounds of mixed ordnance against elements of four ARVN airborne battalions.
- (g) On 7 March, 17 miles west of Tam Ky, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received an enemy attack-by-fire of 80 mortar rounds followed by a ground assault.

MILITARY REGION TWO

None to report.

MILITARY REGION THREE

- (a) On 6 March, 12 miles southeast of Tay Ninh City, a PF platoon received an enemy attack-by-fire of 20 mortar rounds followed by a ground assault.
- (b) On 7 March, 2 miles north-northwest of Saigon, a USAF C-130 aircraft in its final approach to Tan Son Nhut airport was struck by small-arms fire.

MILITARY REGION FOUR

- (a) On 4 March, at Tri Ton, the ICCS compound received one mortar round and intermittent long-range machine gun fire.
- (b) On 5 March, eight miles south-southwest of Soc Trang, elements of a RF battalion received a ground attack by an enemy force.
- (c) On 7 and 8 March, nine separate enemy attacks-by-fire totaling 439 rounds of mixed ordnance were directed at RVNAF elements throughout the region. One of the attacks was followed by a ground assault.
- (d) On 8 March, 9 miles northwest of Kien Thien an RF unit received an ABF of 65 rounds of mixed mortar rocket and recoilless rifle fire.

D. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces in Laos During the Period from 4 March through 8 March

10. The overall pace of fighting in Laos continued to diminish during the reporting period. Major

Communist violations of the ceasefire did occur, however, in Military Region II of Laos.

11. Following is a brief account of significant combat incidents which occurred between 4 and 8 March and which were clearly initiated by Communist forces in violation of the Laos ceasefire agreement:

- (a) On 4 March, activity throughout Laos was light, although Communist forces continued to maintain steady pressure on friendly irregular units operating between Tha Vieng and Xieng Khouangville southeast of the Plain of Jars.
- (b) On 5 March military activity again was light throughout Laos.
- (c) On 6 March two friendly irregular battalions deployed north of Muong Soui in Lao MR II came under heavy shelling attack (approximately 200 rounds) followed by a ground attack by an estimated 200 enemy troops. The irregulars were forced to withdraw. Irregular casualties were placed at three killed and 18 wounded. A ground attack by an estimated two enemy companies was also reported by a royal Lao army unit east of Kengkok in Lao MR III. The rest of Laos was generally quiet.
- (d) On 7 March enemy forces which the previous day had routed irregulars north of Muong Soui in Lao MR II continued to pursue and harass the retreating irregulars. Enemy-initiated activity elsewhere in Laos remained light.

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

ANNEX III

Definition of "major" and "minor" ceasefire violations:

Paragraph 7 of this memorandum contains a table listing the total number of Communist-inspired ceasefire violations reported by the GVN, both for the past week and for the whole period since the ceasefire became effective on 28 January. The determination of whether a violation is "major" or "minor" is based on the following criteria, which have been established by the U.S. Department of Defense.

Major Violation: One in which US/friendly forces, facilities or population centers:

- Receive numerous rounds of enemy mortar, artillery, or rocket fire within a short period of time or sporadically over a period of hours.
- Receive a multi-company (150-400 men) ground attack with or without supporting fire.
- Are subjected to one or more acts of terrorism involving extensive use of mines and demolitions.

Minor Violation: One in which US/friendly forces, facilities or population centers:

- Receive one or a very few rounds of enemy mortar, artillery, rocket, or small arms fire following an extended period during which no stand-off attacks-by-fire were received.
- Receive a small ground probe, unsupported by significant mortar, artillery, or rocket fire, following an extended period during which no attacks of this type were received.

25X1

[REDACTED]

-Are subjected to one or a very few small
terrorist attacks involving use of mines
and demolitions following an extended pe-
riod during which no attacks of this type
were received.

-15-

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Secret



Secret